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IV 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h)(2003). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to Petitioner? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"The decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in the 
sound discretion of the trial court. However; the trial court must base the award on 
evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and 
the reasonableness of the requested fees." Kelly v. Kelly, 9 P.3d 171,181 (Utah Ct. App. 
2000)(quoting Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). Where the trial 
court may exercise broad discretion, the appellate courts will presume the correctness of 
the court's decision absent "manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse 
of. . . discretion." Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah Ct. App.1987). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
This issue was preserved in oral argument and in post trial motions (R. 508; R. 
770, p. 261-62; R. 771, p. 329). 
ISSUE NO. 2 
Did the trial court equitably value and divide the marital estate (property and debt 
distribution)? 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Determining and assigning values to marital property is a matter for the trial 
court, and this Court will not disturb those determinations absent a showing of clear abuse 
of discretion. In making such orders, the trial court is permitted broad latitude, and its 
judgment is not to be lightly disturbed, so long as it exercises its discretion in accordance 
with the standards set by this court." Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993)(citations omitted). "We disturb a trial court's property division and valuation 
'only when there is a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error, me evidence clearly preponderates against the findings, 
or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.5" 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(quoting Noble v. 
Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988)). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
This issue was preserved in oral argument and in post trial motions (R. 504-09, R. 
771, p. 323-27). 
ISSUE NO. 3 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining alimony?1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1
 Issue No. 3 in this brief was raised in Respondent's Docketing Statement, though 
Respondent failed to brief the issue. Petitioner, to maintain a clear record on appeal, will address 
Respondent's failure to brief the issue. 
2 
The Court of Appeals will not disturb the trial court's award of alimony absent a 
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Howell v Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). We have long held that where an appellant fails to brief an issue on 
appeal, the point is waived. See, e g, Reidv Anderson, 211 P.2d 206, 208 (1949); 
McFarlane v. Winters, 201 P.2d 494, 495 (1949); see also Pixton v. State Farm Mutual 
Auto. Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah Ct. App.1991). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
This issue was preserved in oral argument and in post trial motions (R. 500-04; R. 
771, p. 304-23). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1) (2003) 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (2003) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (2003) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (2003) 
Utah R. App. P. 11(2003) 
The complete texts of the above statutes and rule appear in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The parties in this action were married nearly 14 years when Petitioner 
commenced this action for divorce. The parties' marriage had been disintegrating over 
3 
several months prior to the filing. The parties had minor children from previous 
marriages, but never had any children together. The issues of alimony, property and debt 
distribution and attorney's fees were tried before the trial judge over two days. The judge 
ultimately entered the final Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Amended Decree of Divorce and Judgment, from which Respondent appeals. 
2. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Petitioner filed her Petition for Dissolution of Marriage on May 24, 2002 (R. 1). 
Petitioner filed her Motion and Memorandum for Temporary Orders on June 7, 2002, 
with a supporting affidavit (R.11, 17). Respondent filed his Answer and Counterclaim to 
Petition for Dissolution of Marriage on June 11, 2002 (R. 26). On June 11, 2002 
Respondent filed his Motion to Bifurcate, with a supporting affidavit (R. 30, 37). On 
June 21, 2002, Petitioner filed her Reply to Respondent's Counterclaims (R. 48). 
Briefing on Petitioner's Motion for Temporary Orders was completed on June 26, 2002 
and the trial court held a hearing on June 28, 2002 regarding the issues (R. 52, 55, 58, 65, 
68, 81, 87, 156). The trial court entered Temporary Orders and Order in Re: Motion to 
Bifurcate on July 8, 2002 (R. 161). 
Respondent filed a Motion to Reconsider and/or to Amend Temporary Orders on 
September 6, 2002 (R. 177). Petitioner was forced to file an Order to Show Cause in Re: 
Contempt for Respondent's failures to comply with the temporary support orders (R. 201, 
268). Petitioner also filed responses to Respondent's Motion to Amend (R. 201, 211). 
The issues in these matters were before the trial court for hearing on October 11, 2002 (R. 
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273). The trial court took the matters under advisement (R. 273). Another hearing was 
scheduled on December 9, 2002 in reference to Respondent's Motion to Bifurcate and at 
that hearing the trial court reduced the support obligation, adjusted the debt payments and 
ordered that a bifurcated divorce would be entered effective as of February 1, 2003 (R. 
283,354). 
Respondent filed an additional Motion to Sell or Refinance Marital Home and 
Reduce Alimony on April 8, 2003 (R. 318, 320). Petitioner responded and the matter was 
taken under advisement by the trial court at hearings on April 25, 2003 and May 30, 2003 
(R. 360, 408, 411). Trial in this matter occurred on June 24, 2003 and August 12, 2003 
(R. 441, 449). Both parties were given ample time to present their individual cases and 
witnesses. The trial court directed the parties to submit attorney's fees affidavits and 
objections and ordered a deadline for the parties to simultaneously submit their proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 770, p. 261-62). The trial court entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 6, 2003 (R. 484). Respondent filed 
an objection to the proposed Final Decree of Divorce and Judgment on October 22, 2003 
(R. 499). The trial court held a hearing on that objection on February 9, 2004 and the trial 
court entered Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree 
of Divorce and Judgment on March 16, 2004 (R. 590, 596, 611). 
3. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
Trial in this matter occurred on June 24, 2003 and August 12, 2003. Both parties 
were given ample time to present their individual cases and witnesses. The trial court 
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directed the parties to submit attorney's fees affidavits and objections and ordered a 
deadline for the parties to simultaneously submit their proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. The trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on October 6, 2003. Respondent filed an objection to the proposed Final Decree of 
Divorce and Judgment on October 22, 2003. The trial court held a hearing on that 
objection on February 9, 2004 and the trial court entered Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree of Divorce and Judgment on March 16, 2004. 
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties in this action were married nearly 14 years before Petitioner filed this 
action (R. 769, p. 52-53; R. 771, p. 320-22). The parties had minor children from 
previous marriages, but never had any children together (R. 769, p. 93-94; R. 770, p. 223-
24) At the time of the parties' breakup, all of Petitioner's children were over 18 and 
Respondent's son was just graduating from high school (R. 770, p. 223-24). Respondent 
moved out of the marital home and refused to provide any Petitioner any cash assistance, 
even though Petitioner was unemployed at the time (R. 769, p. 68-71; Ex. 12). 
The parties first met at Pepsi Co. in Salt Lake City where they were both employed 
(R. 769, p. 99). Petitioner was employed in administrative support and Respondent as a 
service technician for the vending machines (R. 769, p. 84-85). Pepsi Co. has a non-
fratrainization policy and Petitioner left her employment and supported Respondent as he 
rose though the ranks of the company to become a manager in Southern Utah for Pepsi 
Co. (R. 769, p. 84-6). Respondent receives a base salary and performance bonuses, which 
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he has received every year, that place his yearly income in excess of $100,000.00 (R. 
598-99; R. 769, p. 84-85; R. 770, p. 281-83; Ex. 1). Respondent had significant 
retirement accounts through his employment (R. 770, p. 291; R. 602-06). Just before the 
parties' break up Respondent unilaterally removed $30,000.00 from his marital 401(k) 
account through a loan and used the funds to purchase his son a Jeep Wrangler, sent his 
son on a cruise for high school graduation, and purchased over $6,000.00 in furnishings 
for his new furnished rental (R. 605-06; R. 769, p. 88-90; R. 770, p. 230-31, 284, 291; Ex. 
40). Respondent did not inform Petitioner of the loan or expenditures (R. 769, p. 89; R. 
770, p. 267). 
Petitioner had been employed at various jobs during the parties marriage (R. 769, 
p. 71-77). However, Petitioner does not have any specialized training that would enable 
her to obtain more than relatively low paying employment (R. 769, p. 73, 95-96). 
Petitioner's most recent employment before the parties break up was interior design work 
for a construction company, which provided her with a sporadic income stream (R. 769, 
p. 71-73). After the parties' break up, Petitioner looked for employment that would 
provide consistent income with employment benefits (R.769, p. 77-80, 81; Ex. 3). She 
found employment at an educational tourism company, however she had a monthly 
shortfall between her monthly income and expenses (R. 597-98; R. 769, p. 76-77; Ex. 1). 
Petitioner filed for the entry of temporary orders to assist her with the monthly 
expenses (R. 11, 17). The trial court entered temporary orders and awarded the payment 
of alimony and ordered Respondent to assist with some of the debt payments (R. 161). 
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Five weeks later Respondent moved to modify those temporary orders, which 
modification was ultimately awarded based upon Petitioner finding employment (R.177, 
354). Within a few months after the hearing on that motion, Respondent again filed for a 
reduction of alimony and an order for the immediate sale of the marital residence (R. 318, 
320). Petitioner was forced to respond to that motion, increasing her legal expenses, 
which was never heard by the trial court (R. 360, 408, 411). 
A trial on this matter was held over two days (R. 441, 449). Both parties called 
several individuals as witnesses, including themselves, in support of their claims (R. 441, 
449). Petitioner called her niece Brooke Pierce, who testified concerning a day trip to Las 
Vegas Respondent invited her to in 2001 when Ms. Pierce was about 17 years old (R. 
769, p. 31-32, 33). Ms. Pierce testified that during the trip Respondent made unrequited 
sexual advances towards her, tried to kiss her in a sexual manner, placed his hand on her 
leg in the vehicle, drank alcohol while driving and asked her to cohabitate with him (R. 
769, p. 31-36). The trial court then called Respondent on its own volition after Ms. Pierce 
finished testifying and questioned Respondent concerning these accusations (R. 769, p. 
42-48). Respondent admitted that they stopped in Mesquite, Nevada, that he offered wine 
coolers to Ms. Pierce, a minor, and that he drank the wine coolers in the parking lot of a 
store (R. 769, p. 43-44, 49). Respondent denied drinking while driving and explained to 
the trial court that he had drank the wine coolers before making the drive from Mesquite 
to Las Vegas (R. 769, p. 43-44, 49). 
During the pendency of the divorce matter and trial, Respondent engaged in 
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concealment and mischaracterization of information concerning his assets and earnings 
(R. 771, p. 326-27; Ex. 1, 15, 40). However, Respondent's Exhibit 15, as analyzed by the 
trial court, provides clear evidence of the double accounting and subterfuge Petitioner had 
to sift through to learn of Respondent's actual income and expenses (R. 599-00; R. 770, 
p.263-67, 269-75, 277-78). In an effort to avoid payment of spousal support, Respondent 
in some instances included expenses in three separate locations on his Full Disclosure 
Financial Declaration to artificially increase his monthly expenses (R. 599-00; R.770, p. 
263-67, 269-75, 277-78; R. 771, p. 318-20; Ex. 15). Respondent went even further and 
claimed he made deposits into an IRA with the 401(k) money which he never claimed on 
his taxes (R. 771, p. 326-27; Ex. 1,15, 40). Respondent additionally included expenses 
for his adult child in his calculation of monthly expenses and included expenses that by 
his own admission he was not paying (R. 599-00; R. 770, p. 277-78, 290; Ex. 15). 
Both parties made claims for attorney's fees and costs, which the trial court 
allowed the parties to submit via affidavit (R.6; R. 29; R. 453-83; R.770, p. 221, 261-62, 
295). Petitioner was ordered to file her affidavit first and then Respondent could object to 
Petitioner's claimed fees and provide his own affidavit of fees and costs (R. 770, p. 261). 
Respondent completely failed to file any objection to Petitioner's affidavit or an affidavit 
of his own in support of his claimed fees. The trial court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in this matter (R. 484-97). Respondent filed an objection to the 
Findings and after a hearing, the trial court entered Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and an Amended Final Decree of Divorce and Judgment (R. 499, 
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514, 519, 522, 567, 596, 611, 771). It is from those judgments that Respondent appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Issue No. 1 
The award of attorney's fees to Petitioner was within the trial court's discretion as 
provided in clear Utah legal precedent The Davis v Davis, 16 P.3d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 
2003) decision sets a standard and scope of discretion which the trial court in this matter 
met or exceeded in its findings relative to attorney fees. The trial court clearly acted 
within a scope of its broad discretion and therefore, this Court should affirm the award of 
attorney's fees and costs. Additionally, if this Court affirms the trial court's award of 
attorney's fees, alimony or property distribution this Court should award Petitioner her 
attorney's fees and costs on appeal, Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719, 727 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994); Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Issue No. 2 
The trial court in this matter made an equitable division of the parties assets and 
debts. The Court of Appeals will disturb a trial court's property division only when there 
is a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial 
error, the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings, or such a serious inequity 
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 
P.2d 598, 602 (Utah Ct. App. 199 4)(quotmg Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 
1988)). Such error was not committed by the trial court in this matter. Further, 
Respondent has failed to meet his burden of marshaling the evidence in his brief so that 
10 
this Court can have a meaningful appellate review, and therefore, on this basis alone, the 
trial court's findings should be affirmed. Moon v. Moon, 973 P,2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1999). 
Issue No. 3 
The issue of alimony was raised by Respondent in his docketing statement. 
However, Respondent failed to brief this issue, and therefore has waived that issue on 
-appeal. Smith v. Smith, 832 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1992); see, also, Reidv. Anderson, 111 
P.2d 206, 208 (Utah 1949); McFarlane v. Winters, 201 P.2d 494, 495 (Utah 1949). 
ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE NO. 1 
THE COURT PROPERLY AWARDED PETITIONER HER ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AND COSTS 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1) endows the trial court with discretion to award 
attorney fees, witness fees, expert witness fees and costs in divorce proceedings. That 
discretion has been defined as "broad discretion" by appellate court rulings. "Trial courts 
may exercise broad discretion in divorce matters so long as the decision is within the 
confines of legal precedence." Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). "The decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily 
in the sound discretion of the trial court. However; the trial court must base the award on 
evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and 
the reasonableness of the requested fees." Kelly v. Kelly, 9P.3dl71, 181 (Utah Ct App. 
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2000)(quoting Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). Where the trial 
court may exercise broad discretion, the appellate courts will presume the correctness of 
the court's decision absent "manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse 
of. . . discretion." Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah Ct. App.1987). 
Respondent has failed to demonstrate the trial court committed reversible error in 
exercising its broad discretionary authority in awarding attorney's fees in this matter. 
"
 c[A]n [attorney fee] award must be based on sufficient findings,' and the failure 
to make such findings ' requires remand for more detailed findings by the trial court.'" 
Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716, 720 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). In the Davis case, this Court 
found the following findings of the trial court sufficient to affirm an award of attorney's 
fees: 
Here, the trial court found that the amount of the attorney fees was 
reasonable, given the length of the litigation and the numerous documents 
filed; that Husband had the ability to pay these fees, given a monthly 
income in excess of $4,500; and that Wife demonstrated a need to have 
some assistance with payment of her attorney fees given that her monthly 
expenses exceeded her income by over $700. These factual findings, while 
not extremely detailed, are sufficient to support the award of attorney fees 
and the trial court did not exceed its permitted range of discretion in making 
this award. 
Id. Although this Court acknowledged the factual findings were "not extremely detailed," 
said findings were sufficient to uphold the trial court's discretionary decision. Id. In the 
present matter, Respondent challenges the trial court's findings as inadequate to justify the 
award of attorney's fees to Petitioner. However; the findings of the trial court in this 
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matter are not that different than those found sufficient to support an award of attorney 
fees by the Davis court. 
A. REASONABLENESS PRONG 
In the matter before this Court, the trial judge made the required findings to support 
his award of attorney fees and costs. In reference to the reasonableness of the fees prong, 
the trial court made the following finding: 
Petitioner has incurred significant attorney's fees and costs in bringing this 
matter to conclusion. Petitioner is requesting the amount of $26,676.59, 
based upon the complexity of this matter and the necessity of trial and the 
hourly rates are customary to those charged in this jurisdiction. The Court 
finds that these fees are reasonable, but in order to equalize the division of 
marital assets, the fees assessed by the Court are reduced $1,012.00 which 
amount the Petitioner shall pay herself. 
(R. 608). Thus, the trial court found the fees requested were reasonable based upon: 1) the 
complexity of the litigation; 2) the necessity of trial; and 3) the hourly rates charged were 
customary to those charged in this jurisdiction. The findings as to reasonableness in this 
matter go well beyond the findings upheld in Davis. 
Importantly, the trial court provided Respondent the opportunity to question the 
reasonableness of Petitioner's attorney's fees request and Respondent never filed with the 
trial court any objection to the fees requested (R. 770, p. 261). The trial court also allowed 
Respondent to file an affidavit to support his attorney's fees request (R. 770, p. 261). 
Respondent never filed any such affidavit with the trial court. Under the ruling in Ebbert 
v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), Respondent's failure to object to 
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Petitioner's attorney's fees and costs and failure to provide an affidavit of his own fees and 
costs would preclude him from raising those claims for the first time on appeal. The scope 
of attorney's fees and costs is further supported by Respondent's fabrications and 
exaggerations found by the trial court in Exhibit 15, Respondent's Full Disclosure 
Financial Declaration (R. 599-00). The trial court made the necessary findings of 
reasonableness of the requested fees and Respondent, though given multiple opportunities 
to object, completely failed to preserve the issue. 
B. RECEIVING SPOUSE'S FINANCIAL NEED 
The next prong of analysis is the evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need. 
In respect to this prong, the trial court made the following findings of fact: 
The Court specifically finds that the Respondent is capable of paying this 
amount at the specified rate, and that the Petitioner is unable to pay more 
than the assessed figure of $1,012.00. 
(R. 608). The trial court made a specific finding concerning Petitioner's ability to pay her 
attorney's fees in this matter. Additionally, the trial court made findings in paragraph 4(a) 
of the Amended Final Decree of Divorce and Judgment that Petitioner's net monthly 
income was $1,678.10 and found her reasonable monthly expenses to be $2,984.33 for a 
monthly shortfall of $1,306.23 (R. 597-98). The trial court specifically excluded any 
monthly claims for payment of attorney fees in its calculation of Petitioner's monthly 
expenses (R. 598; R. 771, p. 307-10). The trial court awarded alimony of $1,300.00 per 
month to cover Petitioner's shortfall, therefore Petitioner had no additional monthly 
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income with which to pay her attorney's fees (R. 598-01). The trial court clearly made 
sufficient findings to support its discretionary award of attorney's fees, and the findings 
are certainly adequate under the Davis ruling. The trial court determined the amount of 
attorney's fees that she could pay and determined that she did not have the ability to pay 
above that specific amount (R. 608). 
Respondent argues that Petitioner received ample assets with which to pay her 
attorney fees. However, none of those assets are income producing (R. 597-98, 601-05). 
In order to pay any such fees, Petitioner would be forced to liquidate assets which will 
result in an inequity in the distribution of the marital estate. 
Moreover, Respondent is not entitled to his attorney's fees under the plain language 
of his attorney's fees pleading in his Answer and Counterclaim (R. 29, 261-62). 
Respondent requested that he be awarded "attorney's fees against Petitioner for all claims 
she has asserted in bad faith and without merit as may be support by proof at trial or 
temporary hearings in the interim" (R. 29, 261-62). This language is clearly based on 
Utah Code Arm. § 78-27-56, concerning bad faith litigation. The trial court made no 
finding of bad faith litigation against Petitioner and Respondent never provided the trial 
court with any evidence concerning his attorney's fees and costs. Therefore, Respondent 
cannot now claim that the trail court erred in denying his claim for attorney's fees when 
the trial court made absolutely no findings that Petitioner acted in bad faith and 
Respondent failed to provide any evidence of his attorney's fees and costs. 
C. ABILITY TO PAY 
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Finally, the trial court made sufficient findings concerning Respondent's ability to 
pay. This finding, as quoted above, supra 14, was clearly and distinctly made by the trial 
court and is supported through other findings in the record (R. 608, 598-99, R. 601). The 
trial court found that Respondent had net monthly income of $6,750.54, less his reasonable 
monthly expenses of $3,068.91 per month, for net monthly discretionary income of 
$3,681.63 (R. 601). Deducting $1,300.00 per month for the alimony payment leaves 
Respondent net discretionary monthly income of $2,381.63 (R. 601). Based alone upon 
Respondent's discretionary income, the trial court had a sufficient factual basis to find he 
had the ability to pay Petitioner's attorney's fees. 
The Davis court holding sets a standard and scope of discretion which the trial court 
in this matter met or exceeded in its findings relative to attorney's fees. The trial court 
acted within the scope of its discretion and therefore, this Court should affirm the award of 
attorney's fees and costs. 
Finally, if this Court affirms the trial court's award of attorney's fees, alimony or 
property distribution this Court should award Petitioner her attorney's fees and costs on 
appeal. Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719, 727 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Crouse v. Crouse, 817 
P.2d 836, 840 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
ISSUE NO. 2 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DIVIDED THE PROPERTY AND DEBTS 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) provides the trial court with authority to enter 
equitable orders concerning the distribution of the parties' property and for the payment of 
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obligations or liabilities incurred by the parties during the marriage. 
It has been held that: 
In a divorce proceeding, there is no fixed formula from which to determine 
the division of property. Thus, we afford the trial court considerable latitude 
in adjusting financial and property interests, and its actions are entitled to a 
presumption of validity. The trial court's findings of fact are presumed to be 
correct, and because we lack the advantage of seeing and hearing witnesses 
testify, we do not make our own findings of fact. Accordingly, we view the 
evidence and all the inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom in a 
light most supportive of the trial court's findings. 
Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 542-43 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Further: 
'Determining and assigning values to marital property is a matter for the trial 
court, and this Court will not disturb those determinations absent a showing 
of clear abuse of discretion.' In making such orders, the trial court is 
permitted broad latitude, and its judgment is not to be lightly disturbed, so 
long as it exercises its discretion in accordance with the standards set by this 
court. 
Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(citations omitted). "We 
disturb a trial court's property division and valuation 'only when there is a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial 
error, the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings, or such a serious inequity 
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.'" Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 
P.2d 598, 602 (Utah Ct. App. \99A\qaotmg Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 
1988)). 
MARSHALING REQUIREMENT 
Respondent has completely failed to meet the marshaling duty in his appellate brief 
before this Court. In Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), this honorable 
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Court provided a clear framework for advocates who must marshal evidence on appeal. 
To meet the marshaling requirement, this Court explained: 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. 
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and frilly 
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of 
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trail which 
supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing this 
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a 
fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of the flaw must be sufficient to 
convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the 
evidence is clearly erroneous. 
Id. at 437 (quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991)). "When an appellant fails to meet the 'heavy burden' of marshaling the 
evidence, we 'assume [] that the record supports the findings of the trial court.'" Id. 
(quoting Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 
806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991))). When a party simply reargues their evidence, or a 
version thereof, they have not satisfied the very high burden of the marshaling requirement 
and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed. Id. 
Respondent has utterly failed in his marshaling requirement in his brief. Other 
than sporadic references to the record mixed with brief and unexamined citations and legal 
conclusions, Respondent has failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings and then demonstrate how tfie trial court abused its broad discretion. Respondent 
has absolutely failed to provide this Court with all of the evidence that supports the trial 
court's findings and then ferreted out the fatal flaws. Based alone upon Respondent's 
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failure to meet his marshaling requirements, the trial court's rulings should be affirmed. 
RESPONDENT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO SUPPLEMENT THE 
RECORD 
In his brief, Respondent, attached and makes reference to Appendix A, also referred 
in his brief as Attachment A, which he claims is a summary of several trial exhibits. 
However, these summaries were never produced at trial or in any subsequent hearings and 
never admitted into evidence. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(h) provides a 
procedure by which a party may move the trial court or the appellate court to supplement 
the record before the appellate court. The moving party must serve a statement of 
proposed changes on the other parties. Id. The non-moving parties then have 10-days to 
serve objections to the proposed changes. Id. Respondent has entirely failed to follow this 
procedure and rather simply attached his Attachment A to his brief. 
The issue of parties providing additional evidence or information to the appellate 
court that was not admitted into evidence by the trial court was addressed in the case of 
Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The plaintiff in Ebbert presented 
to the Court of Appeals an affidavit of his counsel to demonstrate that the trial court judge 
"was biased and predisposed to award custody to defendant." Id. at 1023. In refusing to 
consider this affidavit, this Court held that "[m]atters not admitted in evidence before the 
trier of fact will not be considered on appeal to this Court." Id. 
Here, the Court has the full record of the trial court before it, including all trial 
exhibits. Respondent's Attachment A to his brief should not be considered by this Court 
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because it was not admitted into evidence by the trial court. Respondent has not followed 
the proper procedures to supplement the record and therefore, this Court should not 
consider Attachment A. 
THE COURT MADE AN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 
In fashioning equitable property division, the trial court needs to consider all 
pertinent circumstances that exist between the parties. Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). There is no fixed formula to determine the division of a marital 
estate, however; the court is afforded broad discretion based upon the court's equitable 
powers. Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Bradford v. Bradford, 993 
P.2d 887 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). An appellant, seeking to overturn an award of property in 
a divorce action, must articulate the basis of their claim that the distribution was 
inequitable by explaining what property should have been awarded to the parties and how 
the court abused its discretion in awarding the property. Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). Other than providing conclusory statements that the trial court abused its 
discretion, Respondent has failed to marshal the evidence and demonstrate how the trial 
court abused its discretion. 
A. VALUATION OF PROPERTY 
The trial court is afforded broad discretion concerning the division of property and 
the valuation of such property. Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 119-20 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). To permit appellate review, the distribution should be based on adequate findings 
which place a dollar value on the distribution. Id. There is no requirement that the trial 
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court value every item of property, but that the trial court provide sufficient findings of 
fact from which an appellate court can have a meaningful review. 
In this action, the trial court in paragraph 7 of the Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law made specific valuations concerning several items of personal 
property and divided those items between the parties (R. 602-05). Contrary to 
Respondent's assertions, both parties placed the issue of property evaluation at issue 
before the trial court by providing the trial court with differing values for the property 
(Ex. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, 27, 28, 34, 35, 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56). Petitioner 
testified that her values for the property awarded to the parties would be consistent with 
those she listed in tab three to trial Exhibit 1 (R. 769, p. 92-3). Respondent equally 
testified concerning his process for evaluating the parties' property and testified that he 
felt his values were correct (R. 770, p. 247-48, 256-57). While neither party testified that 
they disagreed with the other party's valuations, such disagreement is obvious considering 
the conflicting evidence presented by the parties through Exhibits 1 and 15. Based upon 
that conflicting evidence, the trial court was left to weigh the evidence and determine an 
appropriate valuation of the parties' assets. Respondent has failed to demonstrate that the 
trial court abused its broad discretion in determining the value of the property in this 
action. Without proper marshaling, this Court is left with the proper assumption that the 
trial court effectuated an equitable distribution of the parties' assets. 
Finally, Respondent urges this Court on multiple occasions throughout his brief to 
weigh and assign credibility to the evidence presented at trial. "The trial court is uniquely 
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situated to judge matters bearing on the weight and credibility that should be given to 
evidence, and we will not overturn the court's ruling in this regard unless it is clearly 
erroneous." Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 977 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
Respondent, who failed to marshal all of the evidence and to provide this Court with the 
evidence supporting both sides of the valuation issues, requests that this Court choose one 
side of the evidence over the other. Such weighing of the evidence, without a showing 
that the trail court's decision was clearly erroneous, is not required of this Court. 
B. DIVISION OF PROPERTY 
In dividing a marital estate, the trial court is not bound to effectuate a 
mathematically equivalent division of the property, but is mandated to provide the parties 
an equitable division of their assets. Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). "[A] fair and equitable property distribution is not necessarily an equal 
distribution." Id. To have this Court reverse the trial court's property division Respondent 
must demonstrate that there was a manifest injustice or inequality that indicates a clear 
abuse of discretion. Id. Regardless of this burden, Respondent has failed to marshal the 
evidence and provide this Court with the ability to determine that there has been an abuse 
of discretion. The trial court placed values on several items of property and equalized the 
distribution of those items through an offset on the payment of attorneys fees (R. 602-05; 
R. 606-07). Failure to place a value on each item awarded does not invalidate a trial 
court's award of property. It is equally reasonable to assume that the trial court found the 
values of the remaining items to be essentially equivalent and effectuated an equitable 
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distribution (R.771, p. 323-28). When the issue was brought to the trial court's attention 
through post-judgment motions, the court does indicate on the record that it considered all 
of the evidence and all items not specifically valued and awarded fell under the catch all 
provisions of paragraph 8 of the Amended Decree of Divorce and Judgment (R, 771, p. 
328). 
C. GIFTED ITEMS 
Both parties introduced proposed property valuations and made arguments 
concerning gifted property to the trial court (R. 769, p. 114-17, 148-50; R. 770, p. 201-06, 
207-08, 217-20, 258-61; R. 771, p. 323-28; Ex. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, 27, 47, 48, 54). 
The trial court found that neither party carried their burden of proof on the issue of gifted 
items (R. 602; R. 605; R. 771, p. 327-28). It is essential to point out that most of the 
alleged gifted items were not gifted from third parties, but were intra-spousal gifts or 
family gifts. 
In determining the status of an item of property, the trial court is first faced with the 
determination of whether the property is part of the marital estate or would pass outside 
the marital estate. Intra-spousal gifts can be distinguished from third party gifts or 
inheritance, based solely upon the fact that marital funds are used to purchase the item. 
Additionally, to prove a gift the party alleging the item as a gift must prove by "clear and 
convincing evidence" that there was a clear intention by the "donor to pass immediate 
ownership, an irrevocable delivery, and acceptance." In re Estate of Ross, 626 P.2d 489, 
491 (Utah 1981). The trial court clearly held that the parties did not prove by clear and 
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convincing evidence that the property was gifted, therefore the trial court's ruling should 
be upheld by this Court. 
D. DEBTS 
Contrary to Respondent's arguments, the trial court did consider debt distribution in 
this matter (R. 616, 620-21, 622). Petitioner was ordered to be solely responsible for the 
home mortgage, which the court found had a balance of $97,352.94 (R. 616, 622). 
Additionally, Petitioner was ordered to pay her Mountain American credit card, with a 
balance of $2,118.30, a Sears Card, with a balance of $146.91 and Mountain America 
truck lien, with a balance of $7,000.00 (R. 622; Ex. 1). In total Petitioner was ordered to 
assume and pay $106,618.15 worth of debts. Respondent was ordered to assume and pay 
the debt on his vehicle, which he bought just days before the trial, in the amount of 
$43,657.48, his Mountain America credit card, in the amount of $4,329.33, his Zion's 
Bank credit card, in the amount of $0.00, his AT&T Universal credit card, in the amount 
of $0.00, and his Capital One credit card, in the amount of $7,362.08 (R. 622; Ex. 1, 15)2. 
In total Respondent was ordered to assume and pay $55,348.89 in debts. 
Respondent himself testified that he had accumulated an additional $10,000.00 or 
more in credit card debts after the parties separated (R. 290). Included in that post-
separation debt is at least an additional charge of close to $3,600.00 for jewelry for 
Respondent's paramour (R. 769, p. 127-28; Ex. 13). Additionally, Respondent is servicing 
2
 The amounts used herein are drawn from trial Exhibit 1, which places the outstanding 
balances on Respondent's debts higher than those found in Respondent's Exhibit 15. 
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the debt payment on the 401(k) loan which he took out just before the parties' separation 
which the trial court specifically found was a dissipation of the marital estate (R. 620-21). 
Respondent's credit card debts, if contrasted between Exhibit 1 and 15, are higher in 
Petitioner's Exhibit 1, which are the amounts used here for comparison. Given those 
amounts, Petitioner was still ordered to pay in excess of $50,000.00 more in debt than 
Respondent. If this Court were to add Respondent's 401(k) loan, Petitioner was still 
ordered to pay over $20,000.00 more in debt than Respondent. Respondent will not be 
able to prove that his client suffered any prejudice by the trial court's award, therefore the 
same should be affirmed by this Court. 
ISSUE NO. 3 
RESPONDENT WAIVED HIS ARGUMENT 
In his Docketing Statement on file in this matter, Respondent places the award of 
alimony at issue in this appeal. However, in Respondent's brief on file in this matter, 
Respondent has failed to make any argument or reference to the issue. When a party fails 
to brief an issue, which is properly before the Court, that party is deemed to have waived 
that issue on appeal. Smith v. Smith, 832 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1992); see, also, Reidv. 
Anderson, 211 P.2d 206, 208 (Utah 1949); McFarlane v. Winters, 201 P.2d 494, 495 
(Utah 1949). For clarity in the record, this Court should affirm the trial court's alimony 
award in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should affirm the rulings of the trial court and 
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award Petitioner her attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 30. HUSBAND AND WIFE 
CHAPTER 3. DIVORCE 
-+§ 30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees--Temporary alimony 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to 
establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of 
property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, 
attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party 
to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order may 
include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case," the court may award costs and 
attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the 
claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees 
against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters in the 
record the reason for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide 
money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance 
of the other party and of any children in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or 
judgment may be amended during the course of the action or in the final order or 
judgment. 
Current through Nov. 2, 2004 general election. 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART I. COURTS 
CHAPTER 2A. COURT OF APPEALS 
-f§ 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to 
issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings 
of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, 
State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, 
Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive 
director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, 
and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state 
or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons 
who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions 
constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the 
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
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degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, 
but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child cusrody, 
support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(l) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges 
of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and 
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 
4 6b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. 
Current through Nov. 2, 2004 general election. 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART III. PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 27. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
-•§ 78-27-56. Attorney's fees--Award where action or defense m bad faith--
Exceptions 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action 
was without merit and not brought or asserted m good faith, except under 
Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, m its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a 
parry under Subsection (1; , but only if trie court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before 
the court; or 
(b) the court enters m the record the reason for not awarding fees under the 
provisions of Subsection (1). 
Current through Nov. 2, 2004 general election. 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 30. HUSBAND AND WIFE 
CHAPTER 3. DIVORCE 
-+§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property--Maintenance and health care of parties 
and children--Division of debts—Court to have continuing 
jurisdiction--Custody and parent-time--Determination of 
alimony--Nonmeritorious petition for modification 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable 
orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The 
court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary 
medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring 
the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care 
insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint 
debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during 
marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, 
regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and 
regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances 
are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it 
may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for 
the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the 
custodial parent. 
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(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders 
for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental 
care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born 
to the mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the 
decree by modification. 
(5)(a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of 
grandparents and other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider 
the best interest of the child. J ,•:•• r . ? ,. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a parent-time or 
visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace 
officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered 
under this chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the 
court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended 
against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a parent-time order by a 
parent, or a visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate 
family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation or parent-time right has 
been previously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party 
costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing 
party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered 
visitation or parent-time. 
('8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; - -
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring 
support; 
(vi) whether-the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the 
payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the 
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payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or 
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing 
at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection 
(8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable 
principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living 
that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no 
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider 
the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change 
in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that 
change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in determining 
the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly 
enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may 
make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding 
alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no 
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider 
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new 
orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances 
not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to 
address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was 
entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that 
action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor 
may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share 
living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court 
.finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years 
that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, 
the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for 
a longer period of time. 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Page 5 of 5 
Page 4 
U C A. 1953 § 30-3-5 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any oraer of the 
court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon 
the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the 
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are 
determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates 
upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
cohabitatmg with another person. 
Current through Nov. 2, 2004 general election. 
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C 
WESTS UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED 
'STATE COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
TITLE E. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF TRIAL COURTS 
-•RULE 11. THE RECORD ON APPEAL. 
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court, including the 
presentence report in criminal matters, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index prepared by the clerk of the 
trial court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases. A copy of the record certified by 
the clerk of the trial court to conform to the original may be substituted for the original as the record on appeal. 
Only those papers prescribed under paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the appellate court. 
(b) Pagination and indexing of record. 
(b)(1) Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court shall securely fasten the record in 
a trial court case file, with collation in the following order: 
(b)(1)(A) the index prepared by the clerk; 
(b)(1)(B) the docket sheet; 
(b)(1)(C) all original papers in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(D) all published depositions in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(F) a list of all exhibits offered in the proceeding; and 
(b)(1)(G) in criminal cases, the presentence investigation report. 
(b)(2)(A) The clerk shall mark the bottom right corner of every page of the collated index, docket sheet, and all 
original papers as well as the cover page only of all published depositions and the cover page only of each volume 
of transcripts constituting the record with a sequential number using one series of numerals for the entire record. 
(b)(2)(B) If a supplemental record is forwarded to the appellate court, the clerk shall collate the papers, 
depositions, and transcripts of the supplemental record in the same order as the original record and mark the 
bottom right corner of each page of the collated original papers as well as the cover page only of all published 
depositions and the cover page only of each volume of transcripts constituting the supplemental record with a 
sequential number beginning with the number next following the number of the last page of the original record. 
(b)(3) The clerk shall prepare a chronological index of the record. The index shall contain a reference to the date 
on which the paper, deposition or transcript was filed in the trial court and the starting page of the record'on which 
the paper, deposition or transcript will be found. 
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(b)(4) Clerks of the trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and procedures for checking out the record after 
pagination for use by the parties in preparing briefs for an appeal or in preparing or briefing a petition for writ of 
certiorari. 
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in the event that more than one appeal is 
taken, each appellant, shall comply with the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any 
other action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and transmit the record. A single record 
shall be transmitted. 
(d) Papers on appeal. 
(d)(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be included by the clerk of the trial court as part of 
the record on appeal. 
(d)(2) Civil cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua sponte motion or motion of a party, 
the clerk of the trial court shall include all of the papers in a civil case as part of the record on appeal. 
(d)(3) Agency cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua sponte motion or motion of a party, 
the agency shall include all papers in the agency file as part of the record. 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice to appellee if partial transcript is 
ordered. 
(e)(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall 
request from the court executive a transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the appellant 
deems necessary. The request shall be in writing and shall state that the transcript is needed for purposes of an 
appeal. Within the same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and the clerk of the appellate 
court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a compressed format, appellant shall include the request for a 
compressed format within the request for transcript. If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested, within 
the same period the appellant shall file a certificate to that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy with the 
clerk of the appellate court. 
(e)(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to 
urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall 
include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the 
appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript. 
(e)(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by appellee. Unless the entire transcript is to be included, the 
appellant shall, within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues that will be presented 
on appeal and shall serve on the appellee a copy of the request or certificate and a copy of the statement. If the 
appellee deems a transcript of other parts of the proceedings to be necessary, the appellee shall, within 10 days 
after the service of the request or certificate and the statement of the appellant, file and serve on the appellant a 
designation of additional parts to be included. Unless within 10 days after service of such designation the appellant 
has requested such parts and has so notified the appellee, the appellee may within the following 10 days either 
request the parts or move in the trial court for an order requiring the appellant to do so. 
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on appeal as defined in paragraph (a) of this 
rule, the parties may prepare and sign a statement of the case, showing how the issues presented by the appeal arose 
and were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of the facts averred and proved or sought to be 
proved as are essential to a decision of the issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together with 
such additions as the trial court may consider necessary fully to present the" issues raised by the appeal, shall be 
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approved by the trial court. The clerk of the trial court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate 
court within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court shall transmit the index of the record 
to the clerk of the appellate court upon approval of the statement by the trial court. 
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made or when transcript is unavailable. If no 
report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, or if the 
appellant is impecunious and unable to afford a transcript in a civil case, the appellant may prepare a statement of 
the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, including recollection. The statement shall be served 
on the appellee, who may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days after service. The statement and 
any objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as 
settled and approved, shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal. 
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses 
what occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made to 
conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from the record by error or accident or is 
misstated, the parties by stipulation, the trial court, or the appellate court, either before or after the record is 
transmitted, may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a supplemental record 
be certified and transmitted. The moving party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the 
parties a statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after service, any party may serve objections to the 
proposed changes. All other questions as to the form and content of the record shall be presented to the appellate 
court. 
Current with amendments received through March 1, 2005 
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